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Abstract
Meeting the 1.5 ◦C goal will require a rapid scale-up of zero-carbon energy supply, fuel switching to
electricity, efficiency and demand-reduction in all sectors, and the replenishment of natural carbon
sinks. These transformations will have immediate impacts on various of the sustainable development
goals. As goals such as affordable and clean energy and zero hunger are more immediate to great parts
of global population, these impacts are central for societal acceptability of climate policies. Yet, little is
known about how the achievement of other social and environmental sustainability objectives can be
directly managed through emission reduction policies. In addition, the integrated assessment
literature has so far emphasized a single, global (cost-minimizing) carbon price as the optimal
mechanism to achieve emissions reductions. In this paper we introduce a broader suite of
policies—including direct sector-level regulation, early mitigation action, and lifestyle changes—into
the integrated energy-economy-land-use modeling system REMIND-MAgPIE. We examine their
impact on non-climate sustainability issues when mean warming is to be kept well below 2 ◦C or
1.5 ◦C. We find that a combination of these policies can alleviate air pollution, water extraction,
uranium extraction, food and energy price hikes, and dependence on negative emissions
technologies, thus resulting in substantially reduced sustainability risks associated with mitigating
climate change. Importantly, we find that these targeted policies can more than compensate for most
sustainability risks of increasing climate ambition from 2 ◦C to 1.5 ◦C.
Background
Climate change and sustainable development have a
long history in international diplomacy, and recent
developments have attempted to merge the two agen-
das into a common discourse. Climate change has
been enshrined in the sustainable development goals,
as goal 13, whereas the Paris Agreement in turn has
been strongly framed in the context of sustainable
development (United Nations General Assembly 2015,
UNFCCC 2015).
At the heart of this common discourse is a grow-
ing appreciation that both agendas directly depend
on the success of the other (Stechow et al 2016).
Arguably, sustainable development cannot be achieved
unless the most severe, pervasive and potentially
irreversible climate impacts of business-as-usual devel-
opment to people and natural systems can be
avoided—requiring limiting warming to well below
2 ◦C or possibly even 1.5 ◦C (Edenhofer et al 2014,
IPCC 2014a). However, the means by which such
emissions reductions would be achieved are highly
consequential for future human development. For
instance, a large-scale dependence on bioenergy and
negative emissions deployments could threaten long-
term food security andbiodiversity objectives (Creutzig
et al 2015, Fuss et al 2018, Minx et al 2018).
Conversely, it is becoming increasingly apparent
that sustainable development is a key enabler for cli-
mate change mitigation. For instance, energy access
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(SDG 7) and adequate food supply (SDG 2) are fun-
damental for livelihoods and poverty reduction (SDG
1), but they must be provisioned via low-carbon and
sustainable infrastructures to avoid locking-in future
emissions (Lamb and Rao 2015). Emissions reductions
also require strong institutions (SDG 16), interna-
tional partnerships (SDG 17), innovation (SDG 9),
as well as healthy ecosystems (SDGs 13 and 14).
Many studies have explored the linkages between
climate change mitigation and individual sustainability
objectives. In the integrated assessment model (IAM)
literature, streams of work have focused on climate
policy in the context of household energy access (Riahi
et al 2012, Pachauri et al 2013, Cameron et al 2016).
Another series of studies have explored the economic
implications of climate change mitigation, including
policy costs in the short and long term, technolog-
ical progress, carbon and energy price development,
energy security aspects, and innovation and upscal-
ing (Wilson et al 2013, Jewell et al 2014, Bertram
et al 2015, Rogelj et al 2015). The wider impacts of
climate change policies for other environmental prob-
lems such as local air pollution (West et al 2013,
Strefler et al 2014), water scarcity (Bonsch et al 2016),
deforestation, land-use change, and biodiversity have
also been studied quite intensively (van Vuuren et al
2015), while social aspects have only been scarcely
addressed (Stevanovic´ et al 2017). Literature from a
development angle has explored climate policy path-
ways that protect and enhance low-income livelihoods
(Hallegatte et al 2016), potentially through targeted
policies on high emitters and global reductions in
inequality (Piketty and Chancel 2015, Rao and Min
2018), or by recycling carbon tax revenues into public
goods (Jakob et al 2016).
Yet there have been few attempts so far to
study synergies and trade-offs of mitigation policies
across multiple sustainability objectives quantitatively
(McCollum et al 2018). These studies typically include
either a systematic assessment of existing research on
individual SDG dimensions, within a matrix of poten-
tial policy measures (Weitz et al 2017), or integrated
analysis examining the trade-offs between climate
change mitigation, food security, biodiversity (van
Vuuren et al 2015), food consumption and the land
system (Obersteiner et al 2016). Research efforts from
the sustainable development disciplines are also driv-
ing a ‘energy-water-food nexus’ framing, which has
attracted both integrated modeling studies (Kyle et al
2013, Bonsch et al 2016) and bottom-up case studies
(Biggs et al 2015, Keairns et al 2016). Still, a com-
prehensive assessment of sustainability implications
associated with the 1.5 ◦C limit is so far unavailable.
Such evidence is critical because stringent mitiga-
tion policy involves very aggressive efforts, including
those that remove carbon dioxide from the atmo-
sphere at a very large-scale (Luderer et al 2013, Rogelj
et al 2015, Rogelj et al 2017). Furthermore, while
increasing attention is given to the wider sustainability
implications of mitigation policies, there is little analy-
sis so far regarding how these can be directly managed
through the choice of alternative mitigation policies.
Against this background, the goals of our study are
to: (a) quantify the potential benefits and adverse side-
effects of climate change mitigation on sustainability
indicators, both for 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C; (b) evaluate the
effectiveness of different policies in fostering sustain-
able development; and (c) understand the trade-offs
implied by single instruments and their complemen-
tarity.
Methods
In this study, we provide an integrated analysis of sus-
tainability impacts of 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C scenarios, across
a comparatively large number of sustainability dimen-
sions, and analyze how policy packages addressing
climate and non-climate objectives can help tomanage
wider sustainability impacts.
We use the integrated energy-economy-climate
model REMIND (Leimbach et al 2010, Luderer et al
2015) coupled to the land-use model MAgPIE (Lotze-
Campen et al 2008, Popp et al 2014). Further details
on the two models and their coupling can be found
in supplementary section 1 available at stacks.iop.
org/ERL/13/064038/mmedia. Within this modeling
framework, we construct various transformation path-
ways that lead to two different long-term climate
targets and are differentiated by five different policy
paradigms. In terms of the socio-economic develop-
ment of population, GDP, trade, and development of
technology cost and availability, middle-of-the road
assumptions as in the SSP2 scenario (Fricko et al 2017)
are underlying all scenarios. Scenarios are differenti-
ated along the two dimensions of climate stabilization
target and policy paradigm.
Stabilization target: For the long-term climate tar-
get, we investigate both a ‘well-below 2 ◦C’ scenario
and a ‘1.5 ◦C by 2100’ scenario (table 1). As in Lud-
erer et al (2018) the climate targets are defined via
a bound on cumulative total CO2 emissions (includ-
ing emissions from fossil fuel combustion, industrial
processes and land-use and land-use change). The
bound is adhered by iteratively adjusting the emissions
price on CO2, N2O and CH4, using 100 year global
warming potentials, with reduced prices for emissions
from the land-use system (cf. table 2). Emission pric-
ing starts in 2020 and prices increase exponentially
until 2060 with 5% p.a. in the default policy setting
and linearly thereafter. For the well-below 2 ◦C tar-
get, cumulative 2011−2100 net emissions are limited
to 1000 Gt CO2, whereas the 1.5
◦C scenario has a
budget of 400GtCO2. These budget values represent a
likelihood of 66%of staying below 2 ◦C throughout the
21st century in the ‘well below 2 ◦C’ scenarios, as well
as 66% of staying below 1.5 ◦C after 2100 in the 1.5 ◦C
scenario (Clarke et al 2014, Luderer et al 2018).
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Table 1. Overview of scenarios. For a complete list of policies included in each of the policy paradigm cases and further explanations, see
table 2.
Policy paradigm
Default Regulation Early action Lifestyle Sustainable
Carbon price
increasing at 5%
p.a.
Water and forest
protection;
Nuclear phase-out;
Fossil subsidy
phase-out
Higher initial
carbon price
increase at 3% p.a.
Healthier diets;
Lower energy use
Regulation, early
action, lifestyle
policy approaches
combined
Stabilization
target
Reference
(no mitigation)
REF_Def REF_Sust
Well below 2 ◦C
limit
2 ◦C_Def 2 ◦C_regul 2 ◦C_early 2 ◦C_lifesty 2 ◦C_Sust
1.5 ◦C limit 1.5 ◦C_Def 1.5 ◦C_regul 1.5 ◦C_early 1.5 ◦C_lifesty 1.5 ◦C_Sust
Policy paradigm: As a reference case for the anal-
ysis of stabilization scenarios, we design a default
climate-only policy scenario following cost-effective
achievement of climate targets via a globally and
sectorally harmonized carbon price increasing expo-
nentially at 5% p.a. in real terms. In a second step
we add combined policy packages deviating from the
least-cost paradigm by imposing dedicated technol-
ogy and management regulations in the land and
energy sectors, increased early action mitigation
and lifestyle changes towards less material, energy,
and land intensive-lifestyles (table 2), on top of the car-
bon price. Criteria for the choice of policy elements
are that they have an intuitive linkage to identified
sustainability risks of mitigation, and that they can be
represented in our modeling framework in a meaning-
ful way. The list is therefore not necessarily exhaustive,
and the purpose of grouping elements into the three
distinct policy paradigms serves to illustrate crucial
characteristics and interactions. Since these additional
policies influence the portfolio of mitigation options,
they typically also change the carbon price required to
achieve the same climate target (supplementary figure
S7). The additional policy elements are either imple-
mented by adding bounds to the solution space (for
example requiring a certain share of new vehicle sales to
be electric), by assuming a different value for a certain
input parameter (food and baseline energy demand,
for example, are input parameters to the model), or by
adjusting the temporal profile of carbon price trajecto-
ries (early action scenario).
Table 2 lists the elements of the policy strategies
that are analyzed in this study, and how they are
combined for the three individual policy paradigm
cases ‘Regulation’, ‘Early action’, and ‘Lifestyle’. Fur-
ther description on the implementation of policies can
be found in supplementary section 3.
Indicator selection: We develop customized indi-
cators that capture global stressors for individual SDGs
in our global modeling framework. In case of an
increase of the stressor level due to mitigation, we
speak of a sustainability risk of mitigation, using the
broad IPCC usage of the term ‘risk’ (IPCC 2014b).
Table 3 lists the 12 indicators used in this study and
indicates relevant links to SDGs. We took the freedom
of mapping indicators to SDGs based on the underly-
ing transformation requirements of SDGs, abstracting
from the official sub-targets and related indicators of
them. While no indicator alone is able to fully capture
any of the SDGs, and the time-frame of the analysis
is mostly for 2030−2050, 10 of the 17 SDGs receive at
least some coverage in this analysis.
The indicator selection is constrained by the scope
of the REMIND and MAgPIE models. For instance,
foodprices donot fully address nutritional and calorific
needs; aggregate water withdrawal does not reflect
region specific limits;while cost indicatorsmaynot cap-
ture distributional burdens. The divergence between
a pragmatic and ideal indicator selection is, how-
ever, a feature of all sustainability studies (Jones et al
2016).
While acknowledging the regional heterogeneity of
sustainability impacts and the political importance of
evaluating SDGs on the country level, we here delib-
erately focus on impact indicators aggregated to the
global level. This approach offers greatest conceptual
clarity in quantifying crucial synergies and tradeoffs
between climate change mitigation and other sustain-
ability objectives. Importantly, we do not attempt to
monetarize all sustainability risks in order to mini-
mize an aggregate overall risk indicator.We also refrain
from defining thresholds for intolerable risk levels in
the various sustainability dimensions, given that this
involves value judgments and that for many indica-
tors it is impossible to derive meaningful global-level
thresholds. Regarding the temporal scope of the ana-
lyzed indicators, we have chosen the time frame until
whichmost of the impacts of policy choices have mate-
rialized. Therefore, the analysis goes beyond the target
year of SDGs (2030), as many of these are only mile-
stones on a longer transformation that we capture in
our analysis. Further explanations on the choice, lim-
itation, and definition of the used indicators can be
found in supplementary section 4.
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Table 2. Overview of settings in the different policy paradigms scenarios.
Policy element Policy setting active in scenario....
Setting in default scenarios Policy setting Regulation Early action Lifestyle Sustainability
Trade in agricultural
products (Schmitz et al
2012)
Agricultural trade barriers
(i.e. the amount of the
trade pool with trade
according to historic
patterns) decline by 0.5%
per year
Agricultural trade barriers
decline by 1% per year
(‘Policy scenario’ in
Schmitz et al 2012)
X X
1st generation biofuels
(Lotze-Campen et al 2010)
Constant at 2020 levels Phase-out X X
Water protection (Bonsch
et al 2015)
No dedicated measure Protection of water
resources based on
environmental flow
requirements resulting in
around 40% lower
agricultural water
withdrawals in 2050
globally
X X
Forest protection (Popp
et al 2017)
Linear increase of
protected forest areas by
factor 1.5 between 2010
and 2100
Linear increase of
protected forest areas by
factor 4 between 2010 and
2100
X X
Nitrogen efficiency
(Bodirsky et al 2014)
Soil nitrogen uptake
efficiency converges to
60% globally by 2050;
constant thereafter
Soil nitrogen uptake
efficiency converges to
75% globally by 2050, and
rises to 85% by 2100
X X
Agri. waste management
systems (Bodirsky et al
2014)
30% adoption rate for
anaerobic digesters by
2050.
60% adoption rate for
anaerobic digesters by
2050.
X X
Feeding convergence
(Popp et al 2017)
Faster increase of
productivity in low
income countries;
continuing increase in
high income countries.
20% more efficient X X
Nuclear power (Bauer et al
2012)
No constraint No new plants after 2020 X X
CCS injection Flow constraint of 1% of
total reservoir capacity per
year
Flow constraint of 0.5% of
total reservoir capacity per
year
X
Electric vehicles (IEA
2016)
No dedicated support Dedicated support,
mandating 8, 5 and 2%
LDVmarket share in
different regions in 2020,
each rising by 2% points
per year afterwards
(capped at 80%, reached
around 2060)
X X
Carbon pricing Exponential increase at
5% p.a. from 2020−2060,
linear increase thereafter
Exponential increase at
3% p.a. from 2020−2060,
linear increase thereafter
X X
Pricing of land-use
emissions
50% of price level in the
energy system
25% of price level in the
energy system
X X
Early retirement of coal
power plants
Max 6% linearly per year
(full phase-out earliest in
2035)
Max 10% linearly per year
(full phase-out earliest in
2030)
X X
Fossil fuel subsidies
(Schwanitz et al 2014,
Bertram et al 2015)
Phase-out until 2050 Phase-out until 2030 X X
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Table 2. Contined.
Policy element Policy setting active in scenario....
Setting in default scenarios Policy setting Regulation Early action Lifestyle Sustainability
Final energy demand SSP2 (∼700 EJ in 2050,
900 EJ in 2100)
SSP1 per capita demand
with SSP2 population
assumptions: −25% at the
end of the century
(∼600 EJ in 2050, 700 in
2100)
X X
Agricultural demand
(Bodirsky et al 2014,
Stevanovic´ et al 2017)
Continuation of current
trends, with doubling of
total food demand by the
end of the century, caused
by the increase in
population and income.
−20% below reference
overall at the end of the
century, 50% for livestock
products
X X
Table 3. Analyzed indicators and relevant SDGs. Please note that the cost indicators do not take into account avoided damages due to lower
warming, as the modeling framework does not yet include climate feedbacks and damages. For further explanations on the indicators, see the
list in supplementary section 4.
Indicator Relevant SDG
Food price index in 2030 SDG 2 (Zero hunger)
Water withdrawal for irrigation and power generation in 2030 SDG 6 (Clean water and sanitation)
Short-term costs (cumulative consumption losses from 2015−2050) SDG 1 (No poverty)
Long-term costs (cumulative consumption losses from 2050−2100) SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth)
SO2 emissions from power generation in 2030 SDG 3 (Good health and well-being)
Temperature increase in 2050 relative to 2015 SDG 13 (Climate Change)
Cumulative uranium extraction 2015−2100 SDG 12 (Responsible consumption and production)
Cumulative extraction of fossil fuels SDG 12 (Responsible consumption and production)
Cumulative sequestered CO2 2015−2100 SDG 12 (Responsible consumption and production)
Energy price index in 2030 SDG 7 (Affordable and clean energy)
Cropland for bioenergy crops (average 2050−2100) SDG 15 (Life on Land)
Fertilizer use in 2030 (Nitrogen) SDG 14 (Life below water)
Results
The 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios in this study broadly
share general transformation characteristics with com-
parable scenarios of the literature (Rogelj et al 2013,
2015, Luderer et al 2013) (figure 1). 2 ◦C pathways
are characterized by a peaking of CO2 emissions by
2020, steep emission reductions through mid-century,
and CO2 neutrality or net-negative emissions in the
second half of the 21st century. For 1.5 ◦C path-
ways, near-term emissions reductions are even faster,
and CO2 neutrality is achieved around mid-century.
Decarbonization is achieved by a fast ramp-up of
various low-carbon energy types, electrification of end-
use (supplementary figures S1 and S4), as well as
a strong transformation of land-use (supplementary
figures S5 and S6).
The choice of policy approach alters the scale and
timing of decarbonization, so that the scenarios with
the complete set of additional policy packages (‘_Sust’)
show an earlier and faster decarbonization process
than in the existing literature. Therefore emissions
during the second half of the century remain higher
in comparison to the default mitigation policy sce-
narios, although there are more negative emissions
from afforestation throughout the century, with a
peak around mid-century (figures 1(a),(c)). The
1.5 ◦C_Sust scenario therefore reaches net-negative
emissions already before 2050, but maximum total net
negative emissions are at around 7 Gt CO2 yr
−1 com-
pared to 13 Gt CO2 yr
−1 in the 1.5 ◦C_Def scenario.
The share of low-carbon technologies (renewables,
nuclear and fossils with carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS), figure 1(b)) shows, compared to existing
scenarios, relatively low values for the sustainable
scenarios at the end of the century. The reason is
that the faster decarbonization in the first half leaves
more room for the later use of oil in sectors that
are projected to remain dependent on non-electric
fuels, which are mostly provided by biofuels in default
policy scenarios. Electrification is higher throughout
the century in scenarios with additional sustainability
policies, and due to the dedicated policies on elec-
tric mobility shows a faster near-term increase than
the scenarios from previous studies (supplementary
figure S1).
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Figure 1. General transformation characteristics in the five main scenarios. (a) Total CO2 emissions, (b) share of low-carbon
technologies in total primary energy supply (using direct equivalent accounting method and considering renewables, nuclear and
fossils with CCS as low-carbon) and (c) land-use CO2 emissions. Historic emission data is from EDGAR (EDGAR 2011) and the grey
funnels in the background show the scenarios from previous studies on 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C scenarios (Rogelj et al 2013, 2015, Luderer
et al 2013), selecting those scenarios with a start of ambitious climate policies in 2015 or 2020. Supplementary figure S1 additionally
shows CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry, food price developments over time and the share of electricity in total final energy.
Benefits and risks of 2 ◦Cmitigations pathways
Our default mitigation-only policy scenarios toward
2 ◦C (2 ◦C_Def) highlights benefits and risks associ-
ated withmitigation in non-climate dimensions (called
‘sustainability benefits/risks of mitigation’ from now
on) (figure 2(b)) (Jakob and Steckel 2016, Stechow
et al 2016). Reduced air pollution from fossil fuel use,
and the reduction of temperature increase until 2050 by
more than 0.5 ◦C compared to the no-policy reference
scenario (REF_Def) feature as important benefits of
mitigation. Furthermore, near-term water withdrawal
for irrigation and power generation is slightly reduced
due to a lower deployment of thermal power generation
technologies.
Uranium and fertilizer use increase slightly in the
2 ◦C scenario compared to the baseline, as higher car-
bon prices lead to a further increase of nuclear power
and bioenergy. The demand for biomass, together with
carbon pricing for land-conversion emissions, limit
land available for food production, such that the 2 ◦C
scenariowithdefault pricing-only climate policies leads
to a pronounced increase of 35% in food prices in
15 years, roughly double the projected increase in the
no-policy reference scenario.
Clear sustainability risks of mitigation emerge for
energy price increases, short and long-term mitigation
costs, as well as land requirements for bioenergy and
geological CO2 sequestration. The 2
◦C scenario with
default policies results in an increase of energy prices
of around 45%, more than double the increase with-
out climate policy. A crucial technology option in our
scenarios is the combination of bio-energy with carbon
capture and geological sequestration (BECCS). This
combination leads to removal of carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere and thus can offset some of the resid-
ual emissions that are difficult to avoid (such as fossil
fuel use for freight transport, aviation and shipping,
as well as certain industrial processes and non-CO2
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture (Gernaat
et al 2015)). Our analysis distinguishes two impor-
tant sustainability risks of BECCS, illustrated by the
requirement for land and geological reservoirs. In the
default pricing-only 2 ◦C scenario, close to 300 mil-
lion ha of crop-land are dedicated for growing energy
crops on average between 2050 and 2100, and a cumu-
lative total of more than 700 Gt CO2 is sequestered
in geological formations in this century, 65% of
which originate from BECCS. Finally, economic risks
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Figure 2.Comparative analysis of both policy approaches and long-term targets. Sustainability indicators for 2 ◦C and 1.5 ◦C scenarios
with mitigation-only policy (Def) and combined sustainability policy package (Sust). Panel (a) shows values relative to the 2 ◦C_Def
scenario in logarithmic scale, panel (b) shows the absolute values for all five main scenarios and additionally indicates the time/time-
span shown. All values are global totals or averages. Indicators are arranged such that the most pronounced sustainability benefits of
mitigation sit on top, and the most severe sustainability risks at the bottom. This ranking is based on the relative values, and does not
imply a normative weighting of the different dimensions which can only emerge from broad public deliberations. Please note that
the 2 ◦C_Sust scenario is only shown in panel (b), in order to provide a clear overview in panel (a). A version of panel a including
2 ◦C_Sust is provided as supplementary figure S2.
associated with mitigation are limited in the default
2 ◦C scenario with less than 0.5% of consumption
losses on average during the first 35 years and about
3% during the second half of the 21st century.
1.5 ◦C shows higher benefits but also increased risks
than 2 ◦C
Both sustainability benefits and risks of mitigation
increase further when the long-term mitigation target
is strengthened from 2 ◦C (2 ◦C_Def) to 1.5 ◦C sce-
narios (1.5 ◦C_Def) with default policies. In the
mid-century warming indicator, there is only lim-
ited improvement possible (0.13 ◦C), as the inertia
of both capital stocks and the climate system has
already locked-in a certain amount of warming until
mid-century. Yet this reduced warming could still
imply substantial cost savings due to avoided mon-
etary and physical damages not represented in this
study. For example, small temperature differentials
could help securing the future of coral reefs that
provide crucial ecosystem services (Schleussner et al
2016).
We observe most substantial risk increases for
economic costs: a doubling of long-term costs and a
tripling of short-term costs. This is due to the much
smaller CO2 budget for the 1.5
◦C target that requires
even deeper reductions in residudal fossil fuel emis-
sions and a much greater reliance on carbon dioxide
removal (supplementary figure S6) to pull tempera-
tures back to 1.5 ◦C by 2100 after a brief period of
overshoot (Rogelj et al 2015). For indicators related
to fertilizer use, food and energy prices, CCS and
nuclear, risks increase only incrementally. This is partly
due to assumed maximum deployment levels that are
already reached under the 2 ◦C scenario. For exam-
ple, yearly carbon sequestration of carbon dioxide into
geological reservoirs is constrained by a certain frac-
tion of total reservoir capacity, and this constraint is
already binding in later decades in the 2 ◦C scenario.
Therefore, total CCS storage can only be increased by
accelerating the ramp-up of this technology.
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Dedicated sustainabilty policies can reduce impacts
along many dimensions, and compensate incremen-
tal risks of 1.5 ◦C
Given the widespread concerns with regard to particu-
lar sustainability risks of mitigation (Jakob and Steckel
2016, Stechow et al 2016), the key question is whether
andhow risks (reductions) andbenefits (amplification)
can be directly managed through dedicated policies.
This is particularly important as risks andopportunities
are more significant under 1.5 ◦C than 2 ◦C scenar-
ios (figure 2). Hence, can the additional sustainability
risks of 1.5 ◦C scenarios be reduced or offset through
the combined package of dedicated policies?
The combined additional policies we consider
here (the impact of individual policy components are
discussed below) have a substantially positive impact in
all sustainability indicators with the exception of short
term costs, strongly boosting the benefits, and alleviat-
ingmost risks considerably. In all four indicators where
default mitigation policies already result in a benefit,
the additional benefit from the sustainability policies is
higher than the improvement from moving from 2 ◦C
to 1.5 ◦C. For fertilizer use and food prices, the addi-
tional policies even fully offset the sustainability risks
of mitigation implied by pricing policies, resulting in
a benefit of reducing fertilizer use by one quarter and
food price increases even by three quarters compared
to the baseline.
For some policy risk indicators, a certain risk level
remains even with the targeted sustainability policies.
For four of these indicators, however, energy prices,
bioenergy cropland, long-term costs and geological
storage requirement, the additional sustainability poli-
cies more than offset the risk difference between the
2 ◦C and the 1.5 ◦C scenario, leading to considerably
lower risks in 1.5 ◦C_Sust relative to the 2 ◦C_Def.
Our analysis nevertheless shows that the better
attainment of a broad set of sustainability targets comes
at the price of increased short-term costs. Yet the
interpretation of this trade-off is complicated by the
set of underlying value judgements. First, stakehold-
ers place differing value weights on each dimension,
rendering their comparison problematic outside of a
procedural setting (Edenhofer and Minx 2014, Eden-
hofer and Kowarsch 2015, Kowarsch et al 2017). In this
sense, strengthened (and costly) mitigation ambition
may be judged as appropriate—particularly once the
costs of inaction (and the potential range of additional
benefits) are credited.
It is important to note again that these costs
do not take into account any avoided damages due
to lower temperature increase nor monetary benefits
from reduction in other externalities like air pollu-
tion. Second, there is a trade-off between costs incurred
in the first half of the century vs. costs later on. Under-
lying the optimization that leads to the temporal profile
of mitigation costs in the default scenarios (with higher
relative costs in later decades) is a pure rate of time
preference of 3%. There is a lively debate around
whether or not lower rates at least for later periods
would be called for from an intergenerational justice
point of view (which would favour more balanced
profiles like in the Sustainable scenarios). From a sus-
tainability perspective, it would be important to explore
to what extent higher consumption losses in the near-
term will impact on poverty reduction. However, since
our modeling system does not differentiate within-
region income classes, such an examination is outside
the scope of our analysis.
Complementarity of individual sustainability policy
approaches due to different risk profiles
An analysis of the individual effects of the components
of the sustainable policy package (table 1) shows that
they have significant complementarity, such that their
combination performs best in terms of alleviating sus-
tainability risks of mitigation and enhancing benefits
(figure 3).
The first policy package (‘_regul’) consists of direct
regulation of a range of controversial technologies and
management practices in both the energy and land-use
systems, as well as standards supporting more sustain-
able alternatives. Figure 3(a) shows how this package
of policies impacts the overall sustainability assessment
under 1.5 ◦C policies.
Five of the indicators, water withdrawal, uranium
and CCS deployment, nitrogen use and land for bioen-
ergy crops directly show the desired effect of the
regulation. In the temperature and SO2 indicators, this
policy package also shows a slight benefit, which is
mainly due to the reduced reliance on CCS, which in
turn leads to somewhat higher carbon prices and thus
slighty faster decarbonization. In the socio-economic
indicators, however, clear trade-offs emerge. While the
adverse effect on food prices and long-term costs is very
small, short term economy-wide costs increase bymore
than 50% due to the regulation.
The second policy package (‘_early’), increased
early action, shifts the mitigation burden in time, by
introducing a higher initial carbon price increasing
exponentially at a rate of 3% p.a. compared to the
5% p.a. increase in the default policy scenarios. There-
fore, short-term costs are higher, but long-term costs
lower than in the default case. Additionally, faster
retirement of existing capacity is allowed, and the car-
bon price applied in the land-use system is halved,
which leads to less afforestation (supplementary figure
S6) and negative emissions in the long run and thus
further reduces near-term emissions.
The primary impact of this policy package is a faster
phase-out of fossil fuels in many sectors, which is mir-
rored in lower 2050 temperatures and the SO2 indicator
which is nearly halved in comparison to the default
1.5 ◦C scenario. Nuclear use is expanded faster in the
near-term to make up for the faster phase-out of fos-
sil fuels, giving rise to increased proliferation related
risks. Enhanced early action limits long-term mitiga-
tion pressures, and therefore results in a reduction of
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cropland required for bioenergy in the 2nd half of
the century. The main trade-off resulting from early
action policy package, as with the regulation, is the
much increased short-term cost stemming from higher
initial carbon prices (supplementary figure S7).
The third policy package (‘_lifesty’) consists of
a promotion of less material- and energy-intensive
lifestyles and healthier diets relying on fewer ani-
mal products. Such a policy reduces pressures both
in the energy and land-use system, which are mutu-
ally linked via bioenergy. This leads to considerable
reductions in long-term costs and food security risks.
Through lower demand for fuels, mid-century temper-
atures and CCS requirements for negative emissions
are also reduced. In contrast to the other two policy
types, no stark trade-offs can be observed (with the sole
exception of a 25% increase in SO2 emissions steming
from the a slower phase-out of coal power genera-
tion due to lower carbon prices). This finding suggests
that lifestyle changes have a no-cost character in the
climate change mitigation effort, under the assump-
tion that welfare effects of such behavioural policies
cancel out.
The previous sections have shown that individu-
ally, each of the three considered policy approaches
is effective in reducing risks in some dimensions, but
none manages to bring down risks across the full
set of indicators considered. Furthermore, the reg-
ulation and early action packages exhibit substantial
trade-offs, with especially the short-term cost indica-
tor increasing considerably. Therefore, a combination
of all three policy packages (‘Sust’) might be consid-
ered as a means to complement individual policies and
soften their risks. Indeed, this results in the lowest risk
levels in 8 out of the 12 indicators considered in figures
2 and 3. This not only applies to the 1.5 ◦C scenarios,
but equally is valid for the 2 ◦C scenarios shown in
figure 2 and supplementary figure S3.
Furthermore, short-term costs are, as discussed
above, the only indicator in which the combined sus-
tainability policies lead to a higher risk value than the
default 1.5 ◦C scenario with carbon pricing alone.
Policy implications and outlook
Our results highlight the importance of synergies and
trade-offs that exist between climate and non-climate
sustainability dimensions. Given the inherent require-
ment for value judgments when it comes to weighing
the different dimensions against each other, our results
reinforce the call for an as broad as possible public
deliberation on the exact mix of policies to take within
each country (Jakob and Steckel 2016).
Crucial but unavoidable limitations of our study
comprise deep uncertainties in the framing condition
9
Environ. Res. Lett. 13 (2018) 064038
of the scenario analysis, both with respect to the
future development of some crucial input parameters
of the analysis (socio-economics, technology avail-
ability, costs and performance, etc.), as well as the
structural relationshipwithin and between the analysed
systems (investments and demand for energy services,
demand for agricultural products, working fundamen-
tals of both energy and other markets, etc.). Our way of
generating useful insights under these circumstances
is to concentrate on the qualitative effects of ana-
lyzed policy interventions, and exploring underlying
system effects.
The results highlight that the default policy sce-
nario in the academic literature, in which mitigation
is achieved by the single instrument of carbon pric-
ing, exhibits much higher risk values in a range of
sustainability indicators in comparison to other sce-
narios that include further sustainability measures.
Yet we do not claim that in our analysis such risks
remain within safe limits or sustainability thresholds
even with further measures. Such an assessment would
require much more fine-grained and locally-specific
analysis, which we have to leave to further research.
One economic standard argument for implementing
climate policies via pricing only is cost-effectiveness.
Accordingly the core trade-off in scenarios where sus-
tainability risks are reduced by additional policies is
higher near-term mitigation costs. To what extent
avoidedmonetary damages associatedwith the sustain-
ability riskswouldcompensate for thehighermitigation
costs is an important but challenging avenue for future
research. As shown in this paper, the SDGs also pro-
vide a lens to assess climate policy, hence we see
further work to design and articulate mitigation path-
ways in the context of human well-being, in particular
focusing on food, energy and mobility provisioning—
issues at the heart of an energy transformation
(Lamb and Steinberger 2017).
A central insight of our study is that the benefit of
dedicated sustainability policy in the considered indi-
cators (except short-term costs and energy price) is
higher than the incremental effect of moving from a
2 ◦C to a more stringent 1.5 ◦C target. Even frequently
mentioned sustainability risks of mitigation like land
requirement for energy crops (Fuss et al 2014), food
prices, and nuclear and CCS deployment are much
lower in a scenario reaching 1.5 ◦C with a sustainabil-
ity policy package than reaching 2 ◦C with the single
instrument of a global carbon price.
The analysis of different types of sustainability
policies identifies their relative strengths and weak-
nesses. Dedicated regulation on specific risks fares
best in reducing each risk individually, but typically
increases pressures in other parts of the system. An
increase of early action in comparison to cost-optimal
policies brings down a range of risks and leads to
lower mitigation costs in the long run, but results
in considerably increased near-term costs. Arguments
related to inter-generational equity andhedging against
higher climate sensitivity values or less effective long-
term mitigation might still call for such approaches.
In light of complementary work on inter- and intra-
national inequalities in emissions (Piketty and Chancel
2015, Rao and Min 2018) it would be an important
extension to explicitly consider the impact of dis-
tributional policies which could further ease the
sustainability trade-offs we discuss. Finally, we find that
lifestyle changes that immediately bring down end-use
energy consumption, allow for more flexibility, off-
setting partially the higher short-term costs of early
action.
Shifting towards healthier diets and less energy-
and material-intensive consumption patterns appears
to have greatest potential for reducing sustainability
risks along a wide range of dimensions, although it
is unclear to what extent policy-makers have a direct
handle to bring about the assumed lifestyle changes
and what welfare effects those would have. Certainly,
shifting lifestyles would require confronting prevail-
ing social habits, as well as the constellation of private
interests that sustain, reproduce, and benefit from
existing consumption patterns (Fuchs et al 2016).
Yet such issues are also fundamental to realizing the
‘regulation’ and ‘early action’ policies directed at the
fossil fuel and energy system sectors. Thus while a
combination of diverse policy approaches emerges as
the most promising way to balance climate and other
sustainability risks, the political challenge of doing
so should not be understated. A key task going for-
ward is to explore how such policies can be adapted
for local needs and circumstances, and whether they
can build momentum towards a more encompassing
global engagement in climate and sustainability issues.
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